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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Civil No. 19288 
This is an appeal of an Order granting Summary Judgment in 
favor of Respondents dismissing Appellant's Complaint against 
Respondent Shirley Proctor, the recipient of certain life 
insurance proceeds, and Respondent Insurance Company of North 
America, the payor of those insurance proceeds. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed a Complaint in District Court for Salt Lake 
County seeking recovery of $48,601.50 in life insurance proceeds 
1·1hi ch Respondent Insurance Company of North America had paid to 
Respondent Shirley Proctor under an accidental death policy on 
':he life of one Willis B. Proctor. Respondents answered. 
lnterrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents were 
·xchanged and the deposition of Respondent Shirley Proctor was 
taken. The parties agreed that the matter could be decided by 
the Trial Court on Stipulated Facts. Motions for Summary 
Judgment, supporting Memoranda, and the Stipulated Facts were 
filed by all parties. It was agreed that there were no other 
operative or material facts in dispute. The matter was then 
argued to the Trial Court. The Trial Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision and granted Respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment 
and denied Appellant's Motion. Appellant now appeals the Trial 
Court's Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Shirley Proctor seeks an affirmance of the Trial 
Court's Summary Judgment dismissing Appellant's Complaint and an 
award of her costs incurred in connection with this Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts is substantially correct, 
however, certain additional facts contained in the Stipulated 
Facts filed with the Trial Court have been omitted. Respondent 
will set forth those additional facts so that this Court can be 
apprised of all the facts the Trial Court relied on in granting 
Summary Judgment. The actual Stipulated Facts, as filed with the 
Trial Court, has been included in the Appendix to this Brief and 
labelled Exhibit "1". Additionally, Appellant's reference to the 
Mexican records search, while not at all relevant to the issues 
of this Appeal, necessitates a response. 
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First, with regard to the two policies of life insurance 
rPferred to in Appellant's Statement of Facts, the Decedent 
1v111 is B. Proctor, when purchasing the first policy, affixed to 
1 ;_ a stamp electing for Plan II, entitled "Member and Spouse". 
(R-313). When Mr. Proctor purchased the second policy of 
insurance, he again checked a box on the application entitled 
"Member and Spouse". 
on both applications. 
(R-313). Mr. Proctor's signature appears 
(R-313,314). 
Respondent Shirley Proctor participated in a marriage 
ceremony with Willis B. Proctor in Las Vegas, Nevada, on July 15, 
1967. (R-315) A copy of the marriage certificate reflecting 
such ceremony is attached to the Stipulated Facts, as Exhibit 4. 
(R-320). Willis Proctor resided in Utah from 1967 until his 
death on September 29, 1980. (R-315) .. Respondent Shirley 
Proctor also resided with Mr. Proctor from 1967 on and, in fact, 
both the decedent and Respondent resided together in the home of 
Mr. Proctor's parents continuously for four to five years before 
his death. (R-315). In addition, the decedent and Respondent 
filed joint income tax returns, as husband and wife, for the 
years 1973, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1978, and 1979. (R-315) Mr. 
Proctor filed a separate income tax return for the year 1976, and 
copies of all returns were attached to the Stipulated Facts and 
marked collectively as Exhibit 5. (R-320-333). 
During the period of time the decedent and Respondent 
iesided together, the decedent signed various documents 
indicating Respondent to be his wife. Attached to the Stipulated 
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Facts was a loan application from Consolidated Freightways Credit 
Union (R-334), designating the decedent as being married and 
bearing his signature, and an anniversary card from the decedent 
(R-187) which he sent to Respondent in July of 1980, 
approximately two months before his death. It was admitted by 
all parties that the signatures contained on all of the Exhibits 
attached to the Stipulated Facts were the signatures of the 
decedent Willis B. Proctor. (R-316) 
Turning now to Appellant's statements related to the Mexican 
records search, it should be first noted that the deposition 
referred to was published at the hearing of the Motions for 
Summary Judgment and the same statements as found on pages 3, 4, 
and 5 of Appellant's Brief were made to the Trial Court prior to 
its granting Summary Judgment. The Trial Court considered that 
deposition in making its decision. (R-382) Appellant failed to 
mention the fact that Respondent was initially represented by a 
member of the Bar who was, at the time, experiencing serious 
psychological as well as various other problems. (R-132) . It 
was that counsel who filed the original Answer in this matter and 
failed to appear at a hearing and consequently allowed a Judgment 
to be entered against Respondent. (R-111) At that time, 
Respondent's present counsel appeared, secured a withdrawal from 
Respondent's counsel through D. Frank Wilkins, the lawyer 
appointed by the Utah State Bar to assist Respondent's previous 
counsel (R-125) and obtained an Order setting aside the Judgment. 
(R-145) An Amended Answer (R-157) was then filed establishing the 
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issues that were resolved by the Trial Court in the summary 
Judgment proceeding. 
The Trial Court issued a Memorandum Decision and a copy of 
H1at, together with a copy of the Court's Summary Judgment, have 
been included in the Appendix to this Brief and are labelled 
Exhibits "2" and "3", respectively. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INSURANCE POLICIES IN QUESTION WERE CONTRACTS BETWEEN 
THE INSURED (WILLIS B. PROCTOR) AND THE INSURER (I.N.A.) 
AND AS SUCH, EFFECT IS TO BE GIVEN TO THE INSURED'S 
INTENTIONS THAT RESPONDENT TAKE AS HIS BENEFICIARY 
A. 
GIVEN THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONTRACTS, THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS COMPELLED TO CONSIDER EACH OF THE 
STIPULATED FACTS IN ORDER TC DETERMINE 
THE INTENT OF THE DECEDENT 
In addressing Point I of Appellant's Brief, Respondent 
admits that she was not the "legal" wife of Willis Proctor 
because his divorce from his former wife had yet to become final 
when he married Respondent. Respondent does not admit, however, 
that she cannot be considered the spouse of Mr. Proctor for 
certain limited purposes, including receipt of the insurance 
proceeds in question. As was recognized and stated by the Trial 
Court in its Memorandum Decision: 
. The facts clearly demonstrate that the defendant 
Shirley Worthen (Proctor) was not the legal wife of the 
deceased Willis B. Proctor. This Court is of the 
opinion, however, that whether or not the defendant 
Shirley Worthen (Proctor) was the legal wife or merely 
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held out to be the wife of the deceased Willis B 
Proctor is not the principle issue for this Court t; 
decide, but rather the issue is whether or not it was 
the intent of Willis B. Proctor that Shirley Worthen 
(Proctor) would be the beneficiary under the policies 
before the Court. (R-378) 
It is the intent of the decedent that had to be determined in 
order to protect the integrity of the contract and to assure that 
the result ultimately intended was ultimately obtained. 
Appellant's entire argument revolves around her claim that 
since Respondent was not the "legal" wife of the decedent, she 
is, therefore, not entitled to any benefits of the thirteen year 
relationship which both Respondent and decedent believed to be 
legally proper. (R-177) The argument chooses to ignore the 
basic contract principles related to insurance policies that, if 
at all possible, the intent of the insured should be determined 
and carried out. Appellant suggested to both the Trial Court and 
this Court that the for insurance were clear on their 
faces and consequently there is no need to determine the 
insured's intent. To the contrary, those policies were not 
clear. Neither policy specifically defined "spouse" and more 
importantly the decedent himself physically affixed a stamp and 
checked a box on the policies acknowledging his understanding 
that he did indeed have a spouse at the time he entered into the 
contracts for insurance. Succinctly put, the acts of the 
decedent, when contracting for the insurance, required the Trial 
Court to consider extrinsic evidence to determine his true intent 
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and carry out the same. As was stated in Mathis v. Madsen, 1 
iJt. 2r1 41i, 261 P. 2d 952 (1953), 
That fact alone, however, does not relieve the Court 
(nor this Court) of its responsibility to ascertain its 
[the contract] meaning if that can be done under the 
provisions of law respecting this type of instrument. 
In searching for the meaning the Court must first 
examine the language used in the instrument itself and 
accord to it the weight and effect which the instrument 
itself may show that the parties intended the words to 
have. If then its meaning is still ambiguous or 
uncertain, the Court may consider other contemporaneous 
writings concerning the same subject matter, and may, 
if it is still uncertain, consider parole evidence of 
the parties' intention. (citations) [bracketed 
language added] Id. at 956. 
Under the standards of Mathis, supra, the Trial Court looked 
at the contracts, correctly determined the need for interpre-
tation to determine the true intent of the decedent and then 
considered the stipulated facts agreed to by the parties so that 
the true intent of the decedent could be .determined and followed. 
This Court has always recognized the importance of 
determining the parties' intent in insurance contract cases. In 
Bergera v. Ideal National Life Insurance Company, 524 P.2d 599 
(Utah, 1974), it was noted that in the interpretation of 
insurance policies, 
The policy is merely a contract between the insured and 
the insurer. Its language should be construed pursuant 
to the same rules as were applied to other ordinary 
contracts, to-wit: What did the parties thereto intend 
by the language used? Id. at 600. (Emphasis added.) 
The rule in Bergera, supra, is in accord with numerous other 
;u11sdictions. The supreme Court of Illinois, in New York Life 
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Insurance Company v. Rak, 24 Ill.2d 128, 180 N.E.2d 470 (1962) 
stated: 
In contracts of life insurance where the insured and 
the insurance company are the contracting parties, the 
of insured as to who the beneficiary shall 
be is the intent to be determined. Id. at 472. 
Likewise, in Smith v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 142 
F.Supp. 320 (D.D.C., 1956), the District Court gave effect to 
manifest intention of the insured and stated "The importance of 
one intention of the insured, and the weight to be given to that 
intention, are continually emphasized in the authorities". Id. 
at 324. See also Standard Life Insurance Company of the South v. 
Franks, 260 So.2d 365 (La. App., 1973); Butcher v. Pollard, 32 
Ohio App.2d 1, 288 N.E. 2d 204 (1972); 
In this case the decedent and Respondent were always, in 
their own minds, legally husband and wife. (R-177) When the 
decedent, as member of the Chevron Travel Club, Inc., applied for 
insurance, he chose not to sign up individually, but in 
conjunction with his "spouse". It was the decedent who put the 
stamp designating "spouse" on the first application and checked 
the box labelled "Member and Spouse" on the second application. 
These actions alone lead to the presumption that that if the 
decedent perceived Respondent as his spouse in application for 
the policies, that he also perceived her as his spouse for the 
beneficial aspects of the policy. Likewise, it is logical to 
conclude that if Respondent were to have predeceased Mr. Proctor, 
he would have taken as her beneficiary under the policies. 
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In addition, the actions taken by the decedent, prior to and 
with the designation of Respondent as the 
heneficiary under the policies, also clearly illustrate the 
Jecedent's intent. They married in 1967. (R-320) They lived at 
his parents home from 1975-1980. (R-315) He signed various 
documents indicating Respondent to be his wife. For example, 
both filed and signed joint income tax returns as husband and 
wife for the years 1973, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1978 and 1979, 
IR-321-333) and just two months before his death he sent 
Respondent an anniversary card which stated "For my Wonderful 
Wife on our Anniversary". (R-335) 
Taken together, decedent's actions unequivocally demonstrate 
that he considered Respondent to be his spouse. Although not 
legally married, they held each other out to be husband and wife 
and thereby satisfied the definition of "spouse" in the insurance 
policy. Indeed, the language of the policy itself did not 
specifically require that the insured's wife be the legal wife of 
the insured. Decedent's designation, combined with his 
consistent actions over a 13-year period, satisfied the 
requirement of the policy to establish an intended beneficiary. 
It would be an injustice, therefore, to negate the 
decedent's clear intent only because his marriage is not 
recognized by this State. Although Utah has not specifically 
JPcdt with the issue, a number of jurisdictions have held that an 
"'lawflll marital relationship existing between insured and the 
bPneficiary of his life policy will not furnish a basis for 
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invalidating the insured's actual intent. See, Moore v. 
Traveler's Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 420, 59 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio, 
1944); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 153 S.W.2d 
332 (Tex. 1941); Strachan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 73 N.E.2d 840 
(Mass., 1940); Hendricks v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 27 
A.2d 261 (Pa., 1942); Winbush v. Lyons, 46 S.E.2d 138 (Ga., 
1948); Supreme Tent K.M. of the World v. McAllister, 92 N.W. 770 
(Mich., 1902). 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana dealt with a 
case very similar to the one at hand. In Jones v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Society of U.S., 173 So.2d 373 (La.App., 1965), a 
daughter of the insured's first marriage sued the insurer and 
insured's second wife for proceeds paid under a group life 
policy. The Plaintiff's mother divorced her father in 1929 on 
the grounds of adultery and alleged that the father's second wife 
was a woman living in this open and notorious state. The 
Defendant (second wife) was herself married to a third party 
until June of 1938. Regardless of the two legal marriages 
existing, the decedent and his second wife continuously lived 
together from sometime prior to June 10, 1929, until the 
decedent's death on October 7, 1957. At the time of the death, 
there was in effect a group life insurance policy covering the 
life of the husband. The policy did not name a specific 
beneficiary, but used a preference beneficiary schedule exactly 
like that used in the case at hand. Plaintiff (daughter of first 
wife) brought this action claiming that the second wife was not 
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entitled to the proceeds due to the fact that the marriage was a 
nullity under Louisiana law. The Court, in holding that the 
"e,,nnd wife was legally entitled to the proceeds, stated: 
It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that 
the Plaintiff has failed to prove that the Defendant 
was in bad faith, that she had any knowledge of the 
impediment to her marriage and that under the settled 
jurisprudence of the State of Louisiana, she contracted 
the marriage with the decedent in good faith and would 
therefore, be a putative wife and as such entitled to 
the civil effects of the marriage, that is in this case 
the proceeds from the insurance policy which is the 
subject of this suit. Id. at 377. 
There are also other reasons relied by Courts in deciding 
cases dealing with beneficiary designation and payment of 
proceeds. In Reserve Life Insurance Company v. Mattocks, 6 Ariz. 
App. 450, 433 P. 2d 303 (1967), a case involving the 
interpretation of certain words contained in a health and 
accident insurance policy, the Court of Appeals of Arizona stated 
the accepted principle that: 
We are inclined to agree with the Louisiana Court 
that provisions of the life, health and accident policy 
should be given a liberal interpretation to the end 
that equity be done and the underlying beneficient 
purposes of a contract not be rendered nugatory. Id. 
at 306. 
HPrP, the job of the Trial Court was to determine and protect the 
intent of the decedent. It correctly completed this task. The 
documents and the decedent's overt acts, as well as those of 
Respondent, clearly show what that intent was and the integrity 
··f those contracts should be protected. 
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B. 
THE WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION CASES RELIED UPON 
BY APPELLANT ARE INAPPLICABLE TO A PRIVATE 
INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTE 
Appellant, in her attempt to put forth the position that 
there is no legal recognition of plural marriages, continually 
refers to a line of cases regarding the question of death 
benefits under the Utah Workman's Compensation Act. These cases 
involve the question of whether or not a "common-law" wife of a 
decedent can be allowed to recover statutory death benefits under 
Utah law. They are inapplicable to the questions of contract law 
raised in this case. The cases represented by Appellant's 
citation of Sanders v. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 372, 230 P. 
1026 (1942), in no way addressed the issues of: 
A. Whether or not under contract principles, an 
intended beneficiary will not be allowed to recover said 
proceeds simply because the marriage between the insured and 
the beneficiary was invalid; 
B. Whether or not Defendant in this case was 
equitably entitled to the insurance proceeds on the basis o! 
the Utah Annulment Statutes which vest in this Court the 
discretion to divide and appropriate assets of a voided 
marriage; and 
C. Whether or not Defendant is equitably entitled tc 
receive the benefits of the policy in that her marriage to 
the decedent should be considered valid for these purposes 
only. 
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The question before the Utah Supreme Court in each one of 
the Industrial Commission cases relied upon by Appellant was, 
>•lainly and simply, an interpretation of Utah statutory law 
,f'qarding who is entitled to receive benefits under the Workman's 
Compensation Act. 
The Court in Schurler v. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 284, 
43 P.2d 696 (1935), emphasized that fact when, in deciding who 
was to receive Workman's Compensation dependent benefits, it 
stated: 
The only question in this division of the case, is 
as to whether Mrs. Schurler can be considered a member 
of the decedent's family as that was meant by the 
Compensation Act. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 698. 
This language clearly shows that it is the opinion of the Supreme 
Court of Utah that beneficiary questions in Workman's 
Compensation cases are to be interpreted .from the statutory 
language and not contract principles. In dealing with the public 
funds involved in the benefits of a workman's compensation claim 
the legislature and the Courts are bound by a fiduciary duty to 
be thrifty in protecting those public funds. This is not the 
case when we are dealing with a private insurance contract. The 
binding principle then, as stated in the Bergera case, supra, is 
that the most important element is the intent of the parties 
into the contract. Respondent, through documentation 
example, demonstrated the clear intent of decedent -- that he 
-rn1sidered Respondent his spouse and the beneficiary of his life 
insurance proceeds. 
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Plaintiff also relies heavily on three other cases 
Labor Life Insurance Company v. Parmley, 270 Md. 146, 311 A.2d 24 
(1973), Woolery v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Companv, 406 
F.Supp. 641 (E.D.Va., 1976), and Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company v. Spearman, 344 F.Supp. 665 (M.D.Ala., 1972), and claims 
that these cases should be binding upon this Court. These cases 
are inapplicable to the questions of law raised in this case in 
that the facts are clearly distinguishable. 
In each of these cases, the dispute was between individuals, 
each of which claimed to be the spouse of the decedent. That is 
not the case here. In addition, the decedents were never 
divorced from their first wives and, in fact, appeared to 
maintain some sort of continuing relationship with these prior 
spouses. Again, that is not the case here. Further, the wives 
in those cases had no knowledge of the decedent's ongoing 
relationships with the second spouses. 
Likewise, such was not the case here and, consequently, 
Appellant's reliance on these cases is misplaced. Simply put, 
those Courts were required to decide who, as between a lawful and 
an unlawful spouse, was to receive insurance proceeds. Because 
of their particular facts and the nature of the competing 
interests in each case, the Trial Courts did not deal with the 
contract principals which were before the Trial Court in this 
case. Parenthetically, both Woolery, supra, and Spearman, 
dealt with interpretation of terms under the Federal Employees 
Group Life Insurance Act of 1954, 5 U.S.C.A. §8701, and. 
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therefore, like the Workman's Compensation cases, revolve around 
intPrpretation and application of statutory law. 
POINT II 
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN WILLIS B. PROCTOR AND RESPONDENT 
SHOULD BE EQUITABLY RECOGNIZED AT LEAST FOR THE PURPOSES 
OF DISTRIBUTING THE LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS IN DISPUTE 
Under the principles of equity it would be unfair to negate 
the clear intent of the decedent as to who was to receive the 
insurance proceeds and to disregard the thirteen year 
relationship which both decedent and Respondent believed to be 
valid. 
This Court dealt with a proposition very analogous to the 
one at hand in In Re: Williams Estate, 10 Ut.2d 83, 348 P.2d 684 
11960). In this case, the Petitioner brought an action seeking 
her determination as an heir in the estate of a husband and wife 
who had reared her during her entire childhood. She produced 
circumstantial evidence of a adoption contract between her 
natural mother and the Decedent and claimed that the contract had 
been fully performed with the exception of the failure to obtain 
a legal Decree of Adoption and that equity should require an 
award of specific performance of the same. The Court, in 
protecting the interest of the heir, adopted the theory of 
"equitable adoption" and stated: 
Under the doctrine that the equity regards as done 
what should have been done, she contends that as a 
means of specific performance, she should be awarded 
the same share of the Williamses estate as she would 
15 
have been entitled to had they fully performed their 
contract and fulfilled their agreement to adopt. 
Al though we have never decided this exact 
question, we have required specific performance of 
contracts in contemplation of death, where a deceased 
person has failed to divide, transfer or convey certain 
property in accordance with an agreement for services 
which has been fully performed by the other party. It 
is generally recognized that where a child's parents 
agree with the adoptive parents to relinquish all their 
rights to the child in consideration of the adoptive 
parents' agreement to adopt such child, and to care and 
for it, the same as though it were their own child, and 
such agreement is fully performed by all parties 
connected with such contract except that there is no 
actual adoption, the Court will decree specific 
performance of such contract and thereby award the 
child the same distributive share of the adoptive 
parents' estate as it would have been entitled to had 
the child actually been adopted as agreed. Id. at 
684-685. 
The rationale of the "equitable adoption" theory seems to carry 
over into the family relationship of the case at hand. Decedent 
and Respondent entered into a contract to marry and a contract to 
work and provide for the other, including, among other things, an 
expectation to receive insurance proceeds in the event of 
either's untimely death. Under the circumstances of this case, 
there was at least an "equitable marriage" in existence and, 
therefore, ( 1) the parties should be considered man and wife, at 
least for insurance purposes, and (2) the insurance contracts 
should be construed so as to read Respondent as beneficiary 
regardless of her legal marital status. 
It would also go against the obvious intent of the Utah 
Legislature for any Court to hold that a marital relationship 
between the parties, al though void, should be regarded as void ab 
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all purposes. Section 30-1-17 Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
specifically allows any party to a marriage to seek equitable 
relief in cases involving a void marriage. 
Action to Determine Validity of Marriage 
Judgment of Validity of Annulment. - When there is 
doubt as to the validity of a marriage, either party 
may, in a court of equity in a country where either 
party is domiciled, demand its avoidance or affirmance, 
... Id. 
Section 30-1-17. 2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), additionally provides, 
in part: 
Actions to Determine Validity of a Marriage - Orders 
Relating to Parties, Property and Children - LegitiiiiaC'Y 
of Children If the parties have accumulated any 
property or acquired any obligations subsequent to the 
marriage, or there is a genuine need arising from 
economic change of circumstances due to the marriage, 
or if there are children born, or expected, the court 
may make temporary and final orders, and subsequently 
modify the orders, relating to the parties, their 
property and obligations, the .children and their 
custody or visitation, and the support and maintenance 
of the parties and children, as may be equitable ••• 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
This language clearly acknowledges the very real fact that 
parties, who in good faith believe themselves to be married, do 
acquire "marital" property and obligations, and the Utah Courts 
do have the power to divide such property in an equitable manner. 
This Court acknowledged this proposition in Jenkins v. 
107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d 262 (1944). In this case, the 
Plaintiff brought an action for divorce against her husband. 
uu1ing the trial, the issue was raised as to whether or not the 
"1erriage had ever been valid due to the fact that Plaintiff 
"'ar ried the Defendant during the Interlocutory Period of a prior 
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divorce. The Court held that the marriage was void ab 
but that the Court must equitably treat the distribution of 
marital assets acquired in good faith during that marriage and 
stated: 
. the court clearly had the authority to declare 
the purported marriage void. Where the marriage has 
been entered into in good faith by both parties or 
where, as here, both parties knew of the Interlocutory 
Decree of Divorce, which had not yet become final, the 
court in the exercise of its equitable power has 
jurisdiction to require equitable distribution of the 
property acquired during the time the litigants were 
cohabitating as man and wife. See, Sanguinetti v. 
Sanguinetti, 9 Ca.2d 95, 69 P.2d 845, 111 A.L.R. 342; 
Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal. 354, 295 P. 339; Fuller v. 
Fuller, 33 Kan. 582, 7 P. 241; Werner v. Werner, 59 
Kan. 399, 53 P. 127, 41 L.R.A. 349, 68 Kan.St.Rep. 372; 
Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 30, 190 P. 1088; Deem v. 
Strode, 6 Idaho 317, 55 P. 656, 43 L.R.A. 207, 96 Am. 
St.Rep. 263; Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 P. 
1079, 126 Am.St.Rep. 900; Powers v. Powers, 117 Wash. 
248, 200 P. 1080. Id. at 263-264. 
The Court went on to quote from the Figoni case, supra, and 
stated: 
Likewise, the power of the court to divide 
equally between the parties the property acquired by 
their joint efforts while living together under a void 
marriage entered into in good faith is well 
established. (Citations) Id. at 264. 
The obvious principle of both the Utah statutes and this 
case is that even if a marriage is void ab initio and later 
validly annuled, the parties do have some type of ownership 
status in the marital property of the relationship. It is 
clearly evident from the facts of this case that the insurance 
policies in question were property of this marital relationship, 
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and the beneficial proceeds of each policy were properly to be 
paid tn the survivor of that relationship. 
This position was dealt with specifically by the United 
states Court of Appeals, in the case of Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company v. Manning, 568 F.2d 922 (2nd Cir., 1977). In 
this case, a woman was married, left her first husband and later 
married a second husband without any formal proceedings being 
entered into between the initial parties. Upon the death of the 
wife, the first husband brought this action seeking the payment 
of the $10,000 life insurance proceeds paid under the wife's 
Federal Employee's Group Life Policy. The wife had failed to 
designate a specific beneficiary and, therefore, the proceeds 
were payable to her "widower". The Court stated that Connecticut 
law does characterize a bigamous marriage as "in valid". 
However, the Court then went on to deal with the issue of whether 
or not this good faith relationship of the parties vested in the 
second husband some sort of property rights in the life insurance 
proceeds. The Court discussed this case in conjunction with an 
earlier Connecticut decision [Perlstein v. Perlstein, 152 Conn. 
152, 204 A.2d 909 (1964)] and stated: 
The Perlstein case, discussed above, in connection 
with the Connecticut presumption of validity of a 
second marriage, appears to assume that a bigamous 
marriage is "invalid". In addition, as noted above, we 
do not read Perlstein as precluding an attack on a 
bigamous marriage by a non-party to that marriage even 
in the absence of a judicial decree declaring the 
marriage void. Perlstein, however, forcefully rejects 
the theory that a bigamous marriage is "an absolute 
nulli tv ab ini tio so that nothing in the way of a 
status- or-res-ever= flowed from the marriage" ... and 
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the invalidity ab initio following annulment of a 
bigamous marriage was-characterized as a "legal 
fiction" to be "applied only as the purposes of justice 
require". While the Connecticut courts do not appear 
to have subsequent occasion to elaborate upon this 
language, we believe it means at a minimum, under the 
circumstances of this case, that Manning (second 
husband) would have sufficient status as a "widower" to 
entitle him to the insurance proceeds. For after all, 
the insurance was paid for by deductions from Irene's 
wages earned after the second marriage, during which 
period Irene and Manning consistently held themselves 
out as husband and wife, and during which period Gaines 
(first husband) had nothing whatsoever to do with 
Irene. Gaines did nothing in reliance on his own 
status except to maintain in silence his claim that he 
was Irene's lawful spouse. The "purposes of justice" 
therefore under Connecticut law would not require a 
complete and retroactive invalidation of the Mannings' 
relationship. We hold, at the very least, for the 
purpose of determining Manning's right to the proceeds 
of Irene's Federal Employee's Group Life Insurance, 
that Manning was the lawful widower. Id. at 929. 
(Descriptions added.) 
This Court can, by equity, acknowledge that the marital 
relationship that existed between the insured Decedent and the 
Respondent for the purpose of distributing the proceeds from the 
life insurance of the Deceased only, thereby properly giving 
effect to the intent of the insured Decedent. A reversal 
Trial Court's Summary Judgment, as requested by Appellant, 
necessarily would result in a disregard of the desires and wishes 
of the Decedent and also would ignore long established contract 
maxims designated to protect the intent of the contracting 
parties. This Court has often stated that where there is a 
choice, "an interpretation which will bring about an equitable 
result will be preferred over a harsh or inequitable one", 
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Inc. v. Bitters, 28 Ut.2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007, 1010 
11972). The Trial Court's Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Pespondent has demonstrated her right to receive the 
proceeds of the insurance policies in question. The documents on 
their faces and the acts of Respondent and the decedent clearly 
show that decedent, in contracting with Respondent Insurance 
company of North America, intended Respondent Shirley Proctor to 
receive, as his spouse, the entire amount of the benefits payable 
under the policies upon his death. The cases and statutes also 
clearly show that it was the intent of the Utah legislature and 
the interpretation of the Utah Supreme Court, that even though a 
marriage may be void ab initio, a status in the property of that 
good faith marital relationship does exist and a Court may 
equitably divide such property. Respondent Shirley Worthen 
Proctor is entitled to retain the insurance proceeds paid to her 
as the spouse of Willis B. Proctor. The Trial Court's Summary 
Judgment should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ;;:ft day of September, 1983. 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
! 
; .. /JV.. . ,..1 
lfENT M. KASTING 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Shirley Fletcher aka 
Shirley Worthen 
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<EN'!' M, KASTING 
;11s'l'TN, ADAMS, KAfl'l'Hffi & LIAPIS 
\ttorneys for Defendant, 
Proctor (Worthen) 
uo11 Boston Building 
Ex• hanqe Place 
,olt Lake City, Utah 84111 
elephone: 801/532-6996 
ITLLIAM W. DOWNES, 
:OLLA RD, KUNHAUSEN, PIXTON & IWASAKI 
,ttorneys for Plaintiff 
17 church Street 
alt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COtn{TY 
STATE OF UTAH 
----------00000----------
UZANNE PROCTOR, on behalf of 
er minor daughter, ANGELA BETH 
ROCTOR, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
COMPANY OF NORTH 
qERICA and SHIRLEY FLETCHER 
<a SHIRLEY WORTHEN, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
FILED IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C 81 987 
----------00000----------
COMES NOW the above-named parties, by and through their 
'spective counsel, and hereby submit the following stipulated 
1cts to the Court in connection with the Motions for Summary 
1dqment which have been filed in this matter by Plaintiff and 
Shirley Fletcher Proctor. 
.t.. ""'*' 
-
STIPULATED FACTS 
1. On or about April 1, 1978, a policy of insurance was 
purchased from the Defendant Insurance Company of North America 
through the Chevron Travel Club, Inc., insuring one Willis B. 
Proctor against the loss of life caused by an accident. Willis 
B. Proctor signed the application form and was designated as the 
member and the insured. A copy of this application form and the 
policy of insurance are attached to these Stipulated Facts and 
marked Exhibit 1. 
2. This policy of insurance provides that the insured may 
designate, in writing, a beneficiary and if no beneficiary is 
named the proceeds of said policy of insurance are payable to the 
first surviving class of the following classes of beneficiaries: 
( 1) wife or husband; ( 2) child or children; ( 3) mother or father; 
(4) brothers or sisters. No specific individual beneficiary was 
named by Mr. Proctor in the policy, however, the application had 
affixed to it a stamp electing for Plan II, entitled •Member and 
Spouse•. 
3. On or about January 1, 1979, a second policy of 
insurance was purchased from Defendant Insurance Company of North 
America providing for increased benefits in the sum of $25, 000 to 
the Insured's surviving beneficiary. Mr. Proctor was also 
designated as the insured on this second policy. No specific 
individual beneficiary was named in that application, however, 
the box entitled "Member and Spouse" was checked. Mr. Proctor's 
2 
• 
siynaturP appears on the application. A copy of this application 
, 5 attached to these Stipulated Facts and marked Exhibit 2. 
4. On or about September 18, 1980, Willis B. Proctor 
_.,1stained multiple injuries when a motorcycle he was riding 
collided with an automobile in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
As a result of these injuries, Willis B. Proctor died in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on September 29, 1980. 
5. Angela Beth Proctor, a minor, was born to Willis B. 
Proctor and Suzanne Proctor, the Plaintiff in this action, on 
November 16, 1966. Angela Beth Proctor is the sole surviving 
issue of Willis B. Proctor. 
6. On April 24, 1966, Willis B. Proctor and Suzanne 
Proctor were married; this marriage was dissolved by an entry of 
an Interlocutory Decree of Divorce in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the same to become final three months after its entry on 
March 13, 1968. In connection with the granting of this divorce, 
Willis B. Proctor withdrew his Answer and allowed Suzanne Proctor 
to proceed on a default basis to secure a default Decree. Willis 
B Proctor was present in Court when the Answer was withdrawn, 
however it is not known if he was present when the Suzanne 
Proctor proceeded to give testimony regarding the allegations of 
1er Complaint for Divorce. A copy of the Decree of Divorce is 
•tlriched to these Stipulated Facts and marked Exhibit 3. 
7. The proceeds from the policies of insurance described 
par<lgraphs 1 and 3 above in the sum of $46,701.50 were paid to 
., 
one Shirley Fletcher Proctor by Defendant Insurance Company of 
• 
North America. In addition, there is presently an additional 
$1, 900 still to be paid from Defendant Insurance Company of North 
America to the appropriate beneficiary of the Decedent. Shirley 
Fletcher Proctor claimed to be the wife of the Decedent at the 
time of his death. 
8. Shirley Fletcher Proctor participated in a marriage 
ceremony with Willis B. Proctor in Las Vegas, Nevada, on July 15, 
1967, prior to any Decree of Divorce being entered between Willis 
B. Proctor and Suzanne Proctor. A copy of the marriage 
certificate reflecting this ceremony is attached to these 
stipulated facts and marked Exhibit 4. 
9. Willis B. Proctor resided in the State of Utah in 1967 
and continued to reside in Utah until his death; Shirley Fletcher 
Proctor resided together_ in Utah in 1967 and continues to reside 
in the State of Utah at the present time. Willis B. Proctor and 
Shirley Fletcher resided in the home of Willis B. Proctor's 
parents continuously for four to five years before Decedent's 
death. 
10. Willis B. Proctor and Shirley Fletcher Proctor filed 
joint income tax returns as husband and wife for the years 1973, 
1974, 1975, 1977, 1978 and 1979. Willis B. Proctor filed a 
separate income tax return for the year 1976. Copies of these 
income tax returns have been attached to these Stipulated Facts 
and have been collectively marked Exhibit 5. 
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Jl. During the period of time Willis B. Proctor and Shirley 
, Jelcher Proctor resided together, Willis B. Proctor signed 
, 31 1nus documents indicating Shirley Fletcher Proctor to be his 
wife Attached to these Stipulated Facts is a loan application 
from consolidated Freightways Credit Union designating Willis B. 
Proctor as being married and bearing his signature and an 
anniversary card from the Decedent sent to Shirley Fletcher 
Proctor in July of 1980 and collectively marked Exhibit 6. 
12. All of the signatures contained on the Exhibits 
attached to these Stipulated Facts are the signatures of 
Willis B. Proctor. 
DATED this ...J:2__ day of February, 1983. 
WILLIAM W. DOWNES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
/I);; 
R. 0/;i -
Attorney for Insurance Company 
of North America 
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r FFICE 
-oalt Lake County, Utah 
APR 25 1983 
H D!r.o 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE PROCTOR, on behalf 
of her minor daughter, 
ANGELA BETH PROCTOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH 
A."1ERICA and SHIRLEY FLETCHER, 
aka SHIRLEY WORTHEN, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-81-987 
The reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment filed on behalf 
of the plaintiff against the defendants, and filed on behalf of 
the defendants against the plaintiff came before the Court on a 
stipulated set of facts. The natter was argued at length to the 
Court wherein counsel for the respective parties set forth their 
respective positions, connnented on the stipulated set of facts, 
and offered argument to the Court as to the manner in which the 
stipulated set of facts should be legally interpreted as to their 
respective positions. The Court took the matter under advisement 
to consider the Memoranda filed by the respective parties, the 
Depositions of Shirley Proctor, and the other pleadings and 
documents on file herein. The Court has now carefully reviewed 
PROCTOR VS. INSURANCE 
<.UMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, 
ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
; 11e fulegoing material, and otherwise being fully advised, enters 
,he following Memorandum Decision. 
The Court notes that the policy of insurance which governs 
the claims and defenses in this matter does not specifically 
require under the portion "payment of claims" that the insured' s 
"wife" be the legal wife of the insured. The facts clearly 
demonstrate that the defendant Shirley Worthen (Proctor) was not 
the legal wife of the deceased Willis B. Proctor. This Court 
is of the opinion, however, that whether or not the defendant 
Shirley Worthen (Proctor) was the legal wife or merely held out 
to be the wife of the Willis B. Proctor is not the 
principle issue for this Court to decide, but rather the issue 
is whether or not it was the intent of Willis B. Proctor that 
Shirley Worthen (Proctor) ·would be the beneficiary under the 
policies before the Court. It is this Court's opinion that the 
stipulated set of facts and the documents attached thereto clearly 
show that while Willis B. Proctor and Shirley Worthen (Proctor) 
were not legally married, they held each other out as husband 
and wife. thus satisfying the definition of "wife" in the 
insurance policy for purposes of establishing a beneficiary 
under the policy of insurance upon the death of Willis B. Proctor. 
'"" stipulated set of facts and accompanying documents convince 
PROCTOR VS. INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, 
ET AL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
this Court that both law and equity require that the intent of 
the deceased and insured under the policy, Willis B. Proctor, 
be enforced, and that the evidence preponderates in favor of the 
proposition that it was the clear intent of Willis B. Proctor, 
deceased/insured, that Shirley Worthen (Proctor) be the 
beneficiary under the policies of insurance in question. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court grants the defendant 
Shirley Worthen's Motion for Summary Judgment, and denies the 
Motion for Stmnnary Judgment of plaintiff Susan Proctor on behalf 
of Angela Beth Proctor. 
Counsel for defendant Shirley Worthen (Proctor) is requested 
to prepare an appropriate Order and Summary Judgment in 
accordance with this Memorandum Decision, setting forth this 
Court's opinion that the ·defendant Shirley Worthen (Proctor) is 
entitled to Judgment on the plaintiff's Complaint. The Order 
should further reflect that co-defendant Insurance Company of 
North America is relieved of any responsibility to the plaintiff 
inasmuch as the Court has granted co-defendant Shirley Worthen's 
(Proctor) Motion for Summary Judgment. The proposed Order grantir.: 
Judgment and Judgment should be submitted in accordance with Rule 
2.9 of the Rules of Practice for the Distr· t Courts for the 
State of Utah. 
Dated this day of April, 
DISTRt C 
H. DIXON HINOL5 
Sy 
u ng;4 
ORtJCTOR vs. INSURANCE 
;1MFANY OF NORTH AMERICA, 
ri AL PAGE FOUR 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
ch<: foregoing Memorandum Dec is ion, pas tage prepaid, to the 
following, this ...25'"' day of April, 1983: 
William W. Downes, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1.17 Church Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent M. Kasting 
Attorney for Defendant Fletcher 
1000 Bos ton Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
R James Clegg 
Attorney for Defendant Insurance 
Company of North America 
Ten Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KENT M. KASTING 
EXHIBIT I 3' 
Ii 1 L-•V• C.c.--' j 
,GUSTIN, ADAMS, KAS'i1ING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Shirley Proctor (Worthen) 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801/532-6996 
FILEr IN "LERK'S O 
S;,11 I ·1: FFICE 
-·• ... County. Utah 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
----------00000----------
SUZANNE PROCTOR, on behalf of 
her minor daughter, ANGELA BETH 
PROCTOR, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH 
AMERICA and SHIRLEY FLETCHER 
aka SHIRLEY WORTHEN, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY ,JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C 81 987 
The parties' respective Motions for Summary Judgment based 
upon Stipulated Facts having been argued to the Court on the 
23rd day of February, 1983, and Plaintiff being represented by 
counsel, William W. Downes, Esq., and Defendant, Shirley Fletcher 
aka Shirley Worthen, being represented by counsel, Kent M. 
Kasting, Esq., and the Defendant, Insurance Company of North 
America, being represented by counsel, H. James Clegg, Esq., and 
the parties having agreed and represented to the Court that the 
issues raised by the parties' respective pleadings in this miltter 
-could be res9lve'!_<!_n_9 decided by the Court based upon a set of 
stipulated Facts together with certain attached documents, the 
•"thenticity of which was agreed to by all parties and filed with 
the Court and the parties having agreed that there were no 
other material and operative facts relevant to this matter and 
having further agreed that thecase was ripe for disposition by 
sumroary Judgment and a Motion for the publication of the 
Deposition of Defendant Shirley Proctor having been made and 
granted and the Court having reviewed the Deposition, the 
Stipulated Facts and Exhibits and the legal memoranda and having 
heard argument from counsel and after reviewing all of the 
foregoing and the Court having issued and filed its Memorandum 
Decision and the Court being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as against 
Defendant Shirley Fletcher aka Shirley Worthen and Defendant 
Insurance Company of North America is denied. 
2. Defendant, Shirley Fletcher aka Shirley Worthen's, 
Motion for Summary Judgment for dismissal of Plaintiff's 
Complaint, with prejudice, as against her and Defendant Insurance 
Company of North America is hereby granted. 
3. Plaintiff's Complaint, as the same pertains to 
PL11ntiff's claims against Defendant Insurance Company of North 
'lmr'r l<'a, is hereby dismissed, with prejudice, and this Defendant 
""urance Company of North America is relieved of any 
2 
responsibility to the Plaintiff as alleged in Plaintiff's 
• 
Complaint. 
4. Defendant, Insurance Company of North America's, 
Crossclaim against Defendant Shirley Fletcher aka Shirley 
Worthen, is hereby dismissed, with prejudice. 
5. Defendants are awarded their costs of Court incurred in 
connection with this 
DATED this -f1i-
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE ay 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Dep,fyC 
foregoing Summarv Ju<lgment was placed with "The Runner Service" · 
for delivery to William w. Downes, Jr., Esq., 417 Church Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and to H. James Clegg, Esq., 1100 
Newhouse .Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this of 
<;<4=< ' 1983. -
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent Shirley Fletcher aka Shirley 
p10ctor was placed with "The Runner Service" for delivery to 
William W. Downes, Jr., Esq., Attorney for Appellant, at 417 
Church Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and to H. James 
Clegg, Esq., Attorney for Respondent, Insurance Company of North 
America, at 1100 Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 
